Lifeboat Foundation

The Cartesian model of mind-body dualism concurs with religious traditions. However, science has supplanted this idea with an energy-matter theory of consciousness, where matter is equivalent to the body and energy replaces the mind or soul. This equivalency is analogous to the concept of the interchange of mass and energy as expressed by Einstein’s famous equation [Formula: see text]. Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, provided the intellectual and theoretical framework for a theory of mind or consciousness. Any theory of consciousness must include the fact that a conscious entity, as far as is known, is a wet biological medium (the brain), of stupendously high entropy. This organ or entity generates a field that must account for the “binding problem”, which we will define. This proposed field, the conscious electro-magnetic information (CEMI) field, also has physical properties, which we will outline. We will also demonstrate the seamless transition of the Kantian philosophy of the a priori conception of space and time, the organs of perception and conception, into the CEMI field of consciousness. We will explore the concept of the CEMI field and its neurophysiological correlates, and in particular, synchronous and coherent gamma oscillations of various neuronal ensembles, as in William J Freeman’s experiments in the early 1970s with olfactory perception in rabbits. The expansion of the temporo-parietal-occipital (TPO) cortex in hominid evolution epitomizes metaphorical and abstract thinking. This area of the cortex, with synchronous thalamo-cortical oscillations has the best fit for a minimal neural correlate of consciousness. Our field theory shifts consciousness from an abstract idea to a tangible energy with defined properties and a mathematical framework. Even further, it is not a coincidence that the cerebral cortex is very thin with respect to the diameter of the brain. This is in keeping with its fantastically high entropy, as we see in the event horizon of a black hole and the conformal field theory/anti-de Sitter (CFT/ADS) holographic model of the universe. We adumbrate the uniqueness of consciousness of an advanced biological system such as the human brain and draw insight from Avicenna’s gendanken, floating man thought experiment. The multi-system high volume afferentation of a biological wet system honed after millions of years of evolution, its high entropy, and the CEMI field variation inducing currents in motor output pathways are proposed to spark the seeds of consciousness. We will also review Karl Friston’s free energy principle, the concept of belief-update in a Bayesian inference framework, the minimization of the divergence of prior and posterior probability distributions, and the entropy of the brain. We will streamline these highly technical papers, which view consciousness as a minimization principle akin to Hilbert’s action in deriving Einstein’s field equation or Feynman’s sum of histories in quantum mechanics. Consciousness here is interpreted as flow of probability densities on a Riemmanian manifold, where the gradient of ascent on this manifold across contour lines determines the magnitude of perception or the degree of update of the belief-system in a Bayesian inference model. Finally, the science of consciousness has transcended metaphysics and its study is now rooted in the latest advances of neurophysiology, neuro-radiology under the aegis of mathematics.

Keywords: anatomy & physiology; brain anatomy; disorders of consciousness; philosophy.

Copyright © 2020, Kesserwani et al.

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Dr John Marshall is a leading neuroscientist and a pioneer in the signalling and synaptic trafficking fields, and has made major contributions to understanding brain injury and neurodevelopmental disorders. He received his MSc from the University of Toronto and completed his PhD training in Neurobiology at the MRC at Cambridge University, England. He worked with Professor Len Kaczmarek at Yale University. Marshall assumed his position at Brown University in 1995 and has continued to produce cutting-edge research. His lab focus is on memory and behaviour in rodent models of Angelman syndrome.

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Recently, human brain organoids have raised increasing interest from scholars of many fields and a dynamic discussion in bioethics is ongoing. There is a serious concern that these in vitro models of brain development based on innovative methods for three-dimensional stem cell culture might deserve a specific moral status [1, 2]. This would especially be the case if these small stem cell constructs were to develop physiological features of organisms endowed with nervous systems, suggesting that they may be able to feel pain or develop some form of sentience or consciousness. Whether one wants to envision or discard the possibility of conscious brain organoids and whether one wants to acknowledge or dispute its moral relevance, the notion of consciousness is a main pillar of this discussion (even if not the only issue involved [3]). However, consciousness is itself a difficult notion, its nature and definition having been discussed for decades [4, 5]. As a consequence, the ethical debate surrounding brain organoids is deeply entangled with epistemological uncertainty pertaining to the conceptual underpinnings of the science of consciousness and its empirical endeavor.

It has been argued that neuroethics should circumvent this fundamental uncertainty by adhering to a precautionary principle [6]. Even if we do not know with certainty at which point brain organoids could become conscious, following some experimental design principles would ensure that the research does not raise any ethically problematic features in the years to come. It has also been proposed to redirect the inquiry to the “what-kind” issue (rather than the “whether or not” issue) in order to rely on more graspable features for ethical assessment [7]. These strategies, however, make the epistemological issue even more relevant. The question of whether or not current and future organoids can develop a certain form of consciousness (without presupposing what these different forms of consciousness might be) and how to assess this potentiality in existing biological systems is bound to stay with the field of brain organoid technology for a certain time. Even if it is not for advancing ethical issues, there is a theoretical interest in determining the boundary conditions of consciousness and its potential emergence in artificial entities. Although the methodological and knowledge gap is still wide between the research community on cellular biology and stem cell culture on the one side and the research community on consciousness such as cognitive neuroscience on the other, there will be more and more circulation of ideas and methods in the coming years. The results of this scientific endeavor will, in turn, impact ethics.

In this article, I look back at the history of consciousness research to find new perspectives on this contemporary epistemological conundrum. In particular, I suggest the distinction between “global” theories of consciousness and “local” theories of consciousness as a thought-provoking one for those engaged in the difficult task of adapting models of consciousness to the biological reality of brain organoids. The first section introduces the consciousness assessment issue as a general framework and a challenge for any discussion related to the putative consciousness of brain organoids. In the second section, I describe and critically assess the main attempt, so far, at solving the consciousness assessment issue relying on integrated information theory. In the third section, I propose to rely on the distinction between local and global theories of consciousness as a tool to navigate the theoretical landscape, before turning to the analysis of a notable local theory of consciousness, Semir Zeki’s theory of microconsciousness, in the fourth section. I conclude by drawing the epistemological and ethical lessons from this theoretical exploration.